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upon dissolution of marriage and the Kentucky statute's broad defini-
tion of marital property. In refusing to be "hamstrung by narrow defi-
nitions of property," 33 the Inman court has taken a major step toward
insuring that a person who puts his or her spouse through professional
or graduate school will not be economically handicapped upon dissolu-
tion of the marriage.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SEx DISCRIMINATION-WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION PRESUMPTION OF WIDOW'S DEPENDENCY DOES NOT
VIOLATE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE. Wengler v. Druggists Mutual
Insurance Co., 583 S.W.2d 162 (Mo. 1979). Respondent Wengler
claimed workmen's compensation benefits' for the death of his wife in
a work-related accident. Because Wengler was unable to demonstrate
the requisite dependency,2 the referee denied him compensation. The
Labor and Industrial Relations Committee affirmed the referee's deci-
sion, but the circuit court reversed, holding the statute unconstitu-
tional.3 On appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court reversed and held-
The Missouri workmen's compensation statute, which affords a widow
33. 578 S.W.2d at 269.
1. Wengler filed his claim under Mo. REv. STAT. § 287.240 (1978). Subsection 2 provides
that "[tihe employer shall also pay to the total dependents of the employee a single total death
benefit .. " Subsection 4 defines
"dependent". . . to mean a relative by blood or marriage of a deceased employee, who
is actually dependent for support, in whole or in part, upon his wages at the time of the
injury. The following persons shall be conclusively presumed to be totally dependent for
support upon a deceased employee and any death benefit shall be payable to them, to the
exclusion of other total dependents:
(a) A wife upon a husband legally liable for her support, and a husband mentally or
physically incapacitated from wage earning upon a wife; provided, that on the
death or remarriage of a widow, the death benefit shall cease unless there be other
total dependents entitled to any unpaid remainder of such death benefit under this
chapter.
2. Id. § 287.240. Widows, under the conclusive presumption of dependency, are immedi-
ately eligible for workmen's compensation benefits. The same presumption is denied widowers,
Only a husband who is unable to work because of mental or physical deficiencies is presumed
dependent for support; all other widowers must prove dependency on their deceased wives' wages,
3. The circuit court held that the statute denied equal protection to the widower by requir-
ing proof of dependency while affording a widow the conclusive presumption of dependency at
the death of her husband. Thus, the circuit court's analysis emphasized the disadvantages felt by
the widower, instead of the detriment imposed upon the woman worker whose employment did
not produce the same benefits as that of a male worker. Wengler v. Druggist Mut. Ins. Co., 583
S.W.2d 162, 167 (Mo. 1979).Washington University Open Scholarship
Number 4] RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 1183
a conclusive presumption of dependency but requires a widower to
prove dependency upon his deceased spouse, does not violate the equal
protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment4 or the Missouri con-
stitution.5
Pursuant to the equal protection clause's requirement that similarly
situated persons be treated similarly, courts scrutinize all legislative
classifications that distinguish between groups of people. The thresh-
old question in any equal protection case is the degree of scrutiny the
court will adopt. The appropriate level of scrutiny depends on the type
of interest affected by the classification. The traditional rational rela-
tionship test is highly deferential and requires only that the legislative
classification be rationally related to a legitimate state end.6 In con-
trast, "suspect" classifications or those that infringe on fundamental
rights receive strict scrutiny, which demands a high degree of judicial
involvement in ensuring that the classification is necessary to achieve a
"compelling" state interest.7
During this decade, the Supreme Court has gradually elaborated a
middle-tier test that requires gender-based classifications to serve "im-
portant governmental objectives and [to] be substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives."' Three important aspects of the test
4. "[N]or shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or, property, without due process
of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
5. "[A]II persons. . . are entitled to equal rights and opportunities under the law." Mo.
CONST. art. I, § 2.
6. F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412,415 (1920) stated the test: "a classifica-
tion must be reasonable, not arbitrary and must rest upon having a fair and substantial relation to
the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike."
The Court has traditionally invoked the rational relationship test in areas of economic legislation,
resulting generally in complete deference to legislative determinations. The test does not require
that the classification be closely related to the statutory goal, only that there be some possible
rational basis for the statutory formulation. "Extreme deference to imaginable supporting facts
and conceivable legislative purpose was characteristic of the 'hands off' attitude of the old equal
protection." Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term-Forward" In Search of Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court." A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 21 (1972). See
also 25 DEPAUL L. REv. 210 (1975).
7. Courts first invoked strict scrutiny in response to statutes that were on their face racially
discriminatory. At one point, the Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny to gender-based classifica-
tions. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). The Court also used this test for statutes
involving fundamental rights. Unlike the rational relationship test, strict scrutiny demands exten-
sive judicial questioning and determination of legislative purpose. In addition, there must be a
very close correlation between the classification and the goal that the legislature hoped to achieve.
See Gunther, supra note 6. See also Note, Gender-Based Legislative Classifications, 57 NEB. L.
REV. 555 (1978).
8. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). See generally Gunther, supra note 6, at 17:
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss4/17
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appear to emerge from the cases. If there are alternative possible bases
for the classification-if, for example, the classification might be
viewed as distinguishing female from male workers or, alternatively,
female from male surviving spouses'-the Court's choice between these
alternative perspectives is significant.' 0 Second, the Court carefully
scrutinizes the actual purpose of the classification, instead of accepting
the stated purpose or deferring to conjectural legislative justifications."I
Last, in looking at the means-ends relationship, the Court finds tradi-
tional gender-based stereotypes and generalizations insufficient to meet
the "substantial relationship" requirement.' 2
Before 1971 courts applied minimal scrutiny to gender-based classifi-
cations and upheld most statutes.' 3 In Reed v. Reed,'4 decided in 1971,
The dichotomy between strict and minimal scrutiny repeatedly surfaced during the
past term, to be sure. But there was also an undercurrent of resistance to the sharp
difference between deferential old and interventionist new equal protection: a number of
Justices, from all segments of the Court sought formulations that would narrow the gap
between the widely separate tiers of the Warren Court's equal protection.
9. The classifications in the following cases fit the example: Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S.
199 (1977) (widower must prove dependency to qualify for social security survivor's benefits;
widow presumed dependent); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (widower with de-
pendent children cannot receive social security surviving-parent benefits; widows in same situa-
tion automatically receive); Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 583 S.W.2d 162 (Mo. 1979)
(widowers must prove dependency to receive workmen's compensation death benefits; widows
conclusively presumed to be dependent). Other cases involving the same type of alternative bases
for the classifications are: Califano v. Westcott, 99 S. Ct. 2655 (1979) (AFDC benefits available to
families deprived of support of male parent; unemployment of mother not sufficient); Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (husband of female armed service member must prove depen-
dency to receive dependent's benefits; wife of serviceman automatically receives). Some gender-
based classifications, of course, raise no question of alternative bases because they do not involve
situations in which the activities of one person (the male or female worker) affect the rights of
another person (the male or female dependent or survivor). See, e.g., Califano v. Webster, 430
U.S. 313 (1977) (women receive higher social security benefits upon retirement); Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190 (1976) (females may purchase beer at age 18 but males must be 21); Schlesinger v.
Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) (female armed services officers are allowed four years more than
males before being ousted for nonpromotion).
10. See notes 17-21 infra and accompanying text.
11. See notes 14-16 infra and accompanying text.
12. See notes 22-24 infra and accompanying text.
13. Deference to legislative means and conjecture of legislative purpose, both characteristics
of the rational basis level of scrutiny, rarely resulted in the overturning of gender-based classifica-
tions. "Applying the standard of minimal scrutiny the court invariably held that the distinction
under attack was reasonable in view of the proper role of women in society or the need of the
female for greater protection." Equal Protection and the Middle-Tier: The Impact on Women and
Illegitimates, 78 NOTRE DAME LAw. 303, 313 (1978). See also Gunther, supra note 6; 25 DEPAUL
L. REv. 210 (1975).
14. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
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the Court, although enunciating the traditional rationality test, held
that administrative convenience could notjustify a gender-based classi-
fication. 11 After Reed the Court sustained gender-based classifications
only if the purpose was compensatory. t6
Frontiero v. Richardson17 invalidated a fringe benefit provision that
presumed dependence of a wife of a serviceman but required proof of
dependency of the husband of a servicewoman. For the first time the
Supreme Court viewed the classification from the perspective of the
woman worker and thus recognized that she did not receive the same
compensation as did her male coworker. Had the Court viewed the
classification from the perspective of the serviceman's wife and the ser-
vicewoman's husband, it would have deemed the presumption as favor-
ing the female and thus compensatory.' 8 The importance of Frontiero's
15. Id. That the Court was, in fact, using a higher level of scrutiny than the rational basis
test is clear from the Court's recognition that the classification had "some legitimacy." Id. at 76.
The statutory preference of appointing men instead of women as estate administrators reduced the
number of contested appointments and thus was rationally related to the administrative conven-
ience goal.
16. The Court has approved three gender-based statutory provisions on the theory that the
purpose of the classification was to compensate women for past wrongs. See Califano v. Webster,
430 U.S. 313 (1977); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351
(1974). The last two cases employed the rational basis test, as shown in Kahn: "We deal here with
a state tax law reasonably designed to further the state policy of cushioning the financial impact of
spousal loss upon the sex for which that loss imposes a disproportionately heavy burden." Id. at
355. The two cases represent a retreat from an earlier stance of increased scrutiny. Commentators
have criticized them as "poorly reasoned opinions that have legitimized reverse discrimination."
See 23 N.Y.L.S. L. REv. 503, 508 (1978). These cases are nevertheless significant because the
statutes did not impose a burden on women as a minority group. In Ballard female armed service
officers were entitled to four extra years of commissioned service before discharged for want of
promotion, and in Kahn widows were given a special tax exemption on the death of their spouses.
More recently, in Webster the Court upheld a classification that resulted in the computation of
higher benefits for women under the Social Security Act: "'The only discernible purpose of [215's
more favorable treatment is] the permissible one of redressing our society's longstanding disparate
treatment of women.'" 430 U.S. at 317 (quoting Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 209 n.8
(1977)).
17. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
18. Subsequent cases have adopted Frontiero's analytical framework. See, e.g., Califano v.
Westcott, 99 S. Ct. 2655 (1979); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Weinberger v. Wiesen-
feld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); notes 27-31 infra and accompanying text. In Weinberger the Court
analyzed a social security statute from the perspective of a female worker whose earnings did not
ensure her spouse and children the same benefits on her death as a male worker similarly situated.
The alternative perspective would have involved examining the benefits received by the wife of a
deceased workman and would have allowed the Court to pronounce the statute compensatory. In
Galdfarb the analysis was the same. The Court pronounced that the section of the Social Security
Act under scrutiny
discriminates against one particular category of family-that in which the female spouse
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss4/17
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analytical development is threefold: first, the Court recognized that
women are in the marketplace and that their efforts must be treated
equally to those of men; 9 second, the Court pronounced that it would
invalidate any statutory provision that denigrates a woman's efforts 20
and finally, the Court rejected the traditional stereotypes and general-
izations of female dependency and male independence and announced
that any classification based on these generalizations would fall.2'
In Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld22 the Court demonstrated that it would
no longer defer to the legislature when looking to the purpose of a gen-
der-based classification.23 The Court determined that the true purpose
of the classification in this case was not sufficiently related to the sex of
the parties classified.2'
is a wage earner covered by social security. Therefore, decision of the equal protection
challenge in this case cannot focus solely on the distinction drawn between widowers and
widows but as Wiesenfeld held, upon the gender-based discrimination against covered
female wage earners as well.
Id. at 209. In Westcolt the Court invalidated a statutory provision that provided benefits to fami-
lies whose dependent children lacked parental support because of their father's unemployment. A
family did not receive the same benefits when the mother was unemployed. Instead of noting the
automatic receipt of benefits by a wife and her children when her husband became unemployed,
the Court invalidated the classification on the basis of the detriment felt by the female worker
whose work did not result in the same benefits as a male worker. 99 S. Ct. at 2660-61.
19. 411 U.S. at 686. "The presence of women in business, in the professions, in government
and, indeed, in all walks of life where education is a desirable, if not always a necessary, antece-
dent is apparent and a proper subject of judicial notice." Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 15
(1975).
20. 411 U.S. at 688.
21. Id. at 689-90.
22. 420 U.S. 636 (1975). The Court clearly announced that any gender-based classification
that "denigrated" the efforts of female workers was invalid.
[S]uch a gender based generalization cannot suffice to justify the denigration of the ef-
forts of women who do work and whose earnings contribute significantly to their fami-
lies' support.
Section 402(9) clearly operates as did the statutes invalidated by our judgment in Fron-
tiero, to deprive women of protection for their families which men receive as a result of
their employment.
Id. at 645.
23. Id. at 648.
The mere recitation of a benign, compensatory purpose is not an automatic shield which
protects against any inquiry into the actual purposes underlying a statutory scheme ...
This court need not in equal protection cases accept at face value assertions of legislative
purposes, when an examination of the legislative scheme and its history demonstrates
that the asserted purpose could not have been a goal of the legislature.
Id. at 648 & n.16.
24. Id. The statute allowed social security benefits to a widow with dependent children but
denied the benefits to a widower with dependent children. The Court characterized the actual
purpose of the statute as allowing the widow to stay home with the children. The Court found
Washington University Open Scholarship
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It was not until 1976, however, in Craig v. Boren25 that the Supreme
Court clearly articulated the middle-tier standard that "classifications
by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be
substantially related to the achievement of those objectives."26
Two cases decided after Craig best demonstrate the use and conse-
quences of middle-tier scrutiny. In both Caifano v. Goldfarb27 and
Ca4fano v. Westcott,28 the Court analyzed the statutory classification
from the perspective of the female worker, and concluded that the stat-
ute placed a burden upon her and denigrated her efforts as a worker.29
The next step of the analysis involved a judicial determination of the
purpose of the gender-based classification beyond that apparent from
the face of the statute.3" The Court rejected administrative ease as a
suitable goal. The final step of the analysis scrutinized the means-end
relationship and held that the classifications were based on stereotypes
that the goal of allowing a surviving parent to stay home with minor children was in no way
related to the sex of that parent. Id.
25. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
26. Id. at 210 n.24. The court stated:
As is evident from our opinions, the Court has had difficulty in agreeing upon a standard
of equal protection analysis that can be applied consistently to the wide variety of legis-
lative classifications. There are valid reasons for dissatisfaction with the "two-tier" ap-
proach that has been prominent in the Court's decisions in the past decade. Although
viewed by many as a result-oriented substitute for more critical analysis, that approach-
with its narrowly limited "upper-tier"-now has substantial precedential support. As
has been true of Reed and its progeny, our decision today will be viewed by some as a
"middle-tier" approach. While I would not endorce that characterization and would not
welcome a further subdividing of equal protection analysis, candor compels the recogni-
tion that the relatively deferential "rational basis" standard of review normally applied
takes on a sharper focus when we address a gender-based classification. So much is clear
from our recent cases.
Id.
27. 430 U.S. 199 (1976).
28. 99 S. Ct. 2655 (1979).
29. The Court in Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1976), struck down the statutory provi-
sion that required a widower to prove he had been receiving at least half his support from his
spouse before he qualified for survivor's benefits. A widow was presumed dependent. In Califano
v. Westcott, 99 S. Ct. 2655 (1979), the Court invalidated a provision stipulating that benefits to
families with children would be provided only if the family was deprived of male parental sup-
port.
30. The Court found that the real reason for the gender distinction in Goldfarb was a desire
for "certainty of result and administrative convenience," neither of which is important enough to
justify the continued existence of a gender-based classification that has a detrimental effect on the
female worker. In Westcou the purpose of the classification was to deter paternal desertion. The
Court responded that "evidence indicates that the gender distinction was inserted to reduce cost to
eliminate what was perceived to be a type of superfluous eligibility for AFDC-VF benefits. There
is little to suggest that the gender qualification had anything to do with reducing the father's
incentive to desert." 99 S. Ct. at 2662.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss4/17
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or overgeneralizations and could not meet the substantial relationship
requirement.3
In Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Insurance Co.32 the Missouri
Supreme Court asserted that it would apply the Supreme Court's mid-
dle-tier standard of scrutiny.33 The Court characterized the purpose of
the statutory distinction between widows and widowers as compensa-
tory,34 and relied on statistics in Kahn v. Shevin as empirical evidence
that a widow faced greater hardship upon the death of her spouse than
that faced by a widower. 5 It distinguished the social security cases on
the ground that the employer, rather than the employee, pays the cost
of workmen's compensation benefits.3 6 The Court refused to follow
three other states that have invalidated similar statutes. 7
Although the Missouri court purported to follow the Supreme
31. In Westcott the Court accused Congress of enacting a statute on the premise that the
father of the family is the breadwinner and the woman is dependent upon him for support; as a
result the distinction fell. fd. at 2663.
32. 583 S.W.2d 162 (Mo. 1979).
33. Early in the opinion, the Court clearly announced the standard of scrutiny to be applied
in gender discrimination cases: "To withstand scrutiny under the equal protection clause, classifi-
cation by gender must serve important governmental objectives .. ." Id. at 164. (citing Califano
v. Webster, 430 U.S. at 316-17). When discussing the justification of a gender basis classification,
however, the Court regressed to a rational basis standard of scrutiny: "If the classification has
some 'reasonable basis,' it does not offend the Constitution simply because it 'is not made with
mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.'" Id. at 166 (quoting
Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 769 (1975)) (citing Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220
U.S. 61, 78 (1911)).
34. On its face, sec. 287.240(4)(a) appears tofavor a woman (widow) rather than dis-
criminate against her, in that it affords the widow death benefits on her husband's com-
pensable death without further proof of dependency. . . .[D]ata available . . . at that
time no doubt supported the concept that a widow was more in need of prompt payment
of death benefits upon her husband's death without drawn-out proceedings to determine
the amount of dependency than was a widower.
583 S.W.2d at 168.
35. Id. The statistics in Kahn showed that the median income of a woman was 57.9% of the
median for men, and that in a majority of families in which both spouses are present the woman
did not work. 461 U.S. at 353.
36. The purpose of the workmen's compensation act was not to provide for blanket "so-
cial insurance." It is substitutional to the common law creating rights and remedies in
favor of the injured employee or dependents for accidents in the course of employment.
The employer is the sole contributor to the fund, as opposed to the social security scheme
of mandatory employee contribpstions (taxes) based on an income scale. Therefore the
United States Supreme Court cases of Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, and Calpfano v. Gold-
farb are not controlling in the case at bar.
583 S.W.2d at 167 (citations omitted).
37. Id. at 166-67. Three other state court jurisdictions have invalidated workmen's compen-
sation provisions similar to the one in question in Missouri. See Arp v. Worker's Comp. Appeals
Bd., 19 Cal. 3d 395, 563 P.2d 849, 138 Cal. Rptr. 293 (1977); Tomarchio v. Township of Green-
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Court's rulings,38 it failed to follow the three-step analysis used by the
High Court in sex discrimination cases. The most significant departure
is its examination of the statutory classification from the perspective of
the surviving spouse rather than from that of the deceased wage-earner.
This perspective, combined with the purported distinction between
workmen's compensation and other social insurance, 39 enabled the
court to ignore the Weinberger principle that a female employee is enti-
tled to make the same assurances of economic security to her family as
any male worker may make to his family.4"
The Wengler court also failed to apply the second part of the middle-
tier test, which necessitates a close examination of the true purpose of
the gender-based classification. The court stated that "on its face sec-
tion 287.240(4)(a) appears to favor a woman (widow) rather than dis-
criminate against her, in that it affords the widow death benefits on her
husband's death without further proof of dependence."' The mere
recitation of a benign goal, however, is not sufficient to sustain gender-
based classifications.42  Califano v. Goldfarb clearly indicated that the
courts should independently determine the true reason for the classifi-
cation,43 but the Wengler court's analysis is more like that used under
the rational basis test.4'
wich, 75 N.J. 62, 379 A.2d 848 (1977); Passante v. Walden Printing Co., 53 A.D.2d 8, 385 N.Y.S.2d
178 (1976).
38. See note 33 supra.
39. The Missouri court ignored the reasoning in Westcott, in which the Supreme Court em-
phasized that it is unimportant that work-related benefits are not the result of contributions by
employees.
[Tihis Court has not hesitated to strike down gender classifications that result in benefits
being granted or denied to family units on the basis of the sex of the qualifying par-
ent ....
This does not mean, however, that the Constitution is indifferent to a statute that
conditions the availability of noncontributory welfare benefits on the basis of gen-
der . ..
99 S. Ct. at 2660-61 (citations omitted).
40. See note 18 supra.
41. 583 S.W.2d at 167.
42. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975).
43. 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
44. See notes 6-7 supra and accompanying text. The Wengler court said:
It seems rather obvious therefore that the purpose of the conclusive presumption of de-
pendency was to satisfy a perceived need widows generally had, which need was not
common to men whose wives might be killed while working.
...This hardship was seen by the legislatures as more immediate and pronounced on
women than on men.
583 S.W.2d at 168.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss4/17
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Finally, the Wengler court failed to discuss whether the classification
"substantially" related to the achievement of the statutory end.45 This
failure is in sharp contrast to the Supreme Court's position that all clas-
sifications based upon "'archaic and overbroad' generalizations"4 6 by
their nature are not substantially related to the achievement of impor-
tant statutory goals. It is at this juncture that the analysis of the Mis-
souri Supreme Court significantly departs from precedent. The Court
not only accepted a classification that assumed a widow's dependency
to be substantially related to the major goals of workmen's compensa-
tion, but also sustained two propositions specifically refuted by the
Supreme Court:47 first, that women are less likely to be found in the
work force; and second, that the work of a female employee is less es-
sential to her family's welfare than that of her male counterpart. Thus,
the Missouri court based its approval of this legislation on the same
propositions that have previously caused the Supreme Court to invali-
date similar gender-based statutory classifications.
The United States Supreme Court should reverse Wengler v. Drug-
gists Mutual Insurance Co. because it is not consistent with the Court's
previous gender discrimination decisions. The degree of scrutiny ap-
plied by the Missouri court is much less than that demanded by the
Supreme Court in its application of the middle-tier standard. In effect,
Wengler results in the continued existence of Missouri statutes that
45. See note 33 supra. When stating that classifications can never fit perfectly, the Court
quotes a standard of scrutiny used for classifications measured by the rational relationship test,
instead of quoting the middle-tier standard imposed upon gender-based classifications. 583
S.W.2d at 166.
46. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 643 (1975) (quoting Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419
U.S. 498, 508 (1975)).
47. In Weinberger the Supreme Court suggested that dependency of widows was no longer a
valid rationale for a gender-based classification, but instead that it was an "'archaic and over-
broad' generalization 'not . . .tolerated under the Constitution.'" Id. (quoting Schlesinger v.
Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975)). One of the reasons for the Supreme Court's invalidation of the
gender-based classification in Go/dfarb was the statute's use of the dependency stereotype rather
than actual need as a criterion for receipt of benefits.
On the face of the statute, dependency, not need, is the criterion for inclusion.
Moreover, the general scheme of OASDI shows that dependence on the covered wage
earner is the critical factor in determining beneficiary categories. OASDI is intended to
insure covered wage earners and their families against the economic and social impact
on the family normally entailed by loss of the wage earner's income due to retirement,
disability, or death, by providing benefits to replace the lost wages.
430 U.S. at 213.
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place undue burdens on the female worker in violation of her constitu-
tional right to equal protection.
TORTS-PARENTAL IMMUNITY-UNEMANCIPATED MINOR CHILD OF
DIVORCED PARENTS MAY SUE NONCUSTODIAL PARENT. Fugate v. Fu-
gate, 582 S.W.2d 663 (Mo. 1979) (en banc). An unemancipated minor
sought damages in a wrongful death suit' against her father, alleging
that his negligent operation of an automobile caused the death of her
mother. Defendant and the deceased were divorced prior to the acci-
dent. The divorce decree gave the deceased custody of plaintiff and
granted visitation and temporary custody rights to defendant. The cir-
cuit court, in an evidentiary hearing, found that the suit had not dis-
rupted the harmonious relationship between plaintiff and defendant,2
but nevertheless dismissed the action on the basis of parental immu-
nity. The court of appeals transferred plaintiffs appeal' and the Mis-
souri Supreme Court held- The parental immunity doctrine does not
bar an unemancipated minor child's tort suit against a parent who, pur-
suant to a divorce decree, does not have general custody of the child at
the time the tort occurs.4
The parental immunity rule first appeared in the United States5 in
1. Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by a wrongful act, neglect or default
of another, and the act, neglect or default is such as would, if death had not ensued, have
entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof,
then, and in every such case, the person who or the corporation which would have been
liable if death had not ensued shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding
the death of the person injured, which damages may be sued for and recovered
(1) By ... minor children ... of the deceased
Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.080 (1978) (amended 1979).
2. Witnesses at the hearing included defendant, plaintifis paternal grandmother, and a
close family friend. All testified that the parties' relationship was good both before and after the
suit was filed. Brief for Appellant at 2, Fugate v. Fugate, 582 S.W.2d 663 (Mo. 1979) (en banc).
3. The Missouri Court of Appeals decided that the "statewide interest and importance" of
the matter required its transfer to the Missouri Supreme Court. 582 S.W.2d at 664.
4. Id. at 669.
5. Apparently, there were no reported English cases of parent-child tort actions for negli-
gence. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 865 (4th ed. 1971); McCurdy, Torts
Between Persons in Domestic Relations, 43 HARV. L. REv. 1030, 1059 (1930); Comment, Tort,4c-
tions Between Members of the Famil;'-Husband& We-Parent & Child, 26 Mo. L. REv. 152, 180
(1961).
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